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HSMs and the Evolving PKI Ecosystem

Mark B. Cooper
President & Founder
PKI Solutions Inc.
October 2014

THALES

- **About PKI Solutions Inc.**

- 10 years as Microsoft Senior Engineer for PKI
- Numerous books and whitepapers
- Services include:
 - ADCS Architecture, Deployment and Consulting
 - Assessment and Remediation Services
 - In-Depth PKI Training
 - Retainer and Support Services

- **PKI ecosystem changes**
- **BYOD and Internet of Things**
- **Security threats**
- **Leveraging HSMs**
- **Deployment challenges**

PKI ecosystem changes

- **PKI adoption rates are quickly increasing**
- **Evolving usage scenarios**
 - **Traditional uses**
 - **Greater product integration and dependencies**
- **Scaling and availability**
 - **Fault tolerance**
 - **OCSP**
- **Integration into continuity plans**

- **Evolving to meet the new enterprise**
 - **Disconnected**
 - **Unmanaged**
 - **Diverse**
 - **Computers AND devices**

BYOD and IoT impact

- **BYOD and corporate security policies**
 - 180 degree change from traditional models
 - Primarily user driven demand
- **Accessibility**
 - What's the cost?
 - Risk versus reward
- **Affects security postures**
 - BYOD S/Mime & Smart cards
 - Weaknesses will be exploited

- **IoT evolving**
 - **Tighter interaction with corporate networks**
 - **De-evolution of PSTN and side-band communications**
- **IoT challenges everything**
 - **Integrated OS**
 - **Management**
 - **Security**
 - **Identity**
- **Shell Bash**
 - **Weaknesses will be exploited**

Security threats

- **Data theft no longer theoretical exercises**
 - Valuable information will be sought by others
 - Internal, domestic and foreign interests and gain
- **Outright compromises**
 - Target
 - Michael's
- **Vulnerabilities**
 - Heartbleed
 - Shell Bash

Leveraging HSMs

- **Disconnects keys and access**
 - **OS and devices have limited access to keys**
 - **Compromises and vulnerabilities reduced**
- **Implements Role Separation**
 - **Internal attacks and social engineering**

- **HSM and CA Signing Keys**
 - **Traditional use of HSM and CA**
 - **Most valuable keys, but not the only ones**
- **OCSP Responder**
 - **Signs revocation queries on-behalf of CA**
 - **Revocation is key to trust of PKI – keys are valuable**

- **Network Device Enrollment Service**
 - **Microsoft's SCEP implementation**
 - **Enrolls and renews devices**
 - **Designed for segmented authentication & enrollment**
 - **New whitepaper from Microsoft**
 - **NDES Keys secured on HSM (Explicitly tested with Thales)**
 - **Firewall and hardening recommendations**
 - **"Securing and Hardening Microsoft Network Device Enrollment Service"**

- **Manufacturers**
 - **Leveraging PKI for device identities**
 - **IoT maturity demands**
- **HSMs role in manufacturing**
 - **Integrated for CA key protection**
 - **Combined with TPM for end-to-end protection**
 - **Thales nCipher**

Deployment challenges

- **Old Habits**
 - **Theoretical threats hard to quantify**
 - **Software doesn't require HSM**
 - **"It won't happen to us"**
- **Challenges rarely in the technology**
 - **People resources**
 - **Policies**
 - **Budgets**

- **InfoSec groups are still the exception**
- **Difficulty to define quorums and role owners**
 - **Separation of duties and collusion requirements**
 - **Still compromising and right-sizing to environments**
- **PKI depends on clear policies**
 - **Defines security risks, policies and rules**
 - **Highly dependent on controls to enforce**

- **Enterprises strive for secure – default to easy**
- **Hard to enforce security policies**
 - **#1 vulnerability to secure data centers**
- **PKI depends on clear policies**
 - **Defines security risks, policies and rules**
 - **Highly dependent on controls to enforce**

- **Budget Challenge – “We’ll do it in the future”**
 - **Must be part of initial deployment**
 - **Integration later is possible, but integrity is questionable**
 - **“A moment alone can never be undone”**
- **Response**
 - **Value of protected keys is diminished in the future**
 - **Additional expense to migrate and integrate**
 - **If worth protecting with PKI, why not do it properly?**
 - **PKI without protections is a false sense of security**

- **Budget Challenge – “It’s too expensive”**
 - **Cost of acquiring and integrating HSMs**
 - **Perceived value of protecting “our lowly keys”**
 - **“We’re not a target”**
- **Response**
 - **Cost of acquisition is considerably cheaper than a compromise**
 - **Think about this challenge after a compromise**

Questions?

ADCS Hotfix Digest:

<http://pkisolutions.com/adcs-hotfixes>

mark@pkisolutions.com || pkisolutions.com || @pkisolutions

Available Training

4 Day ADCS In-Depth Server 2012 R2

Washington, DC: November 4-7, 2014

San Francisco, CA: January 27-30, 2015

New York City, NY: February 2015 (TBA)

mark@pkisolutions.com || pkisolutions.com || @pkisolutions