



CA/BROWSER FORUM

CERTIFICATE
VALIDITY
UPDATES

2025

PKI
SOLUTIONS





INTRODUCTION

Since the news about changes to certificate validity was released, we have received numerous questions and observed a significant amount of misinformation stemming from misunderstandings. In this white paper, our goal is to provide background information and guidance to support future planning. Specifically, we aim to clarify how the upcoming changes — shortening certificate validity periods — will impact public and private PKI-issued certificates differently.

Where The Guidelines and Updates Come From:

The [Certification Authority Browser Forum \(CA/Browser Forum\)](#) is a voluntary gathering of Certificate Issuers and suppliers of internet browser software and other applications that use certificates (Certificate Consumers).

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FAQs

QUESTION:

Will upcoming changes to certificate validity periods impact internal PKI issued certificates?




ANSWER:

No, the CAB Forum guidelines only impact certificates from publicly trusted certification authorities.

QUESTION:

Should organizations follow new certificate duration guidelines with their internal PKI?



ANSWER:

Most likely no. These new guidelines specifically target how browsers interact with publicly trusted certificates. PKI teams may want review their use cases, it is not necessary to apply the guidelines to all issued certificates.



IMPORTANT DATES FOR CHANGING CERTIFICATE VALIDITY PERIODS

Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods:

- Subscriber Certificates issued before **March 15th, 2026** should not have a Validity Period greater than **397 days** and must not have a Validity Period greater than **398 days**.
- Subscriber Certificates issued on or after **March 15th, 2026** and before **March 15th, 2027** should not have a Validity Period greater than **199 days** and must not have a Validity Period greater than **200 days**.
- Subscriber Certificates issued on or after **March 15th, 2027** and before **March 15th, 2029** should not have a Validity Period greater than **99 days** and must not have a Validity Period greater than **100 days**.
- Subscriber Certificates issued on or after **March 15th, 2029** should not have a Validity Period greater than **46 days** and must not have a Validity Period greater than **47 days**.

REFERENCE FOR MAXIMUM VALIDITY PERIODS OF SUBSCRIBER CERTIFICATES*

 Certificate issued on or after	 Certificate issued before	 Maximum Validity Period
Before March 15 th , 2026	March 15 th , 2026	398 days
March 15 th , 2026	March 15 th , 2027	200 days
March 15 th , 2027	March 15 th , 2029	100 days
March 15 th , 2029		47 days

*source: <https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/releases/tag/BRs/v2.1.5>

WHO MUST FOLLOW CAB FORUM RULES?

The simple answer is only public or third-party certificates must adhere to the CAB Forum rules and guidelines.

How do systems and browsers differentiate between Public and Internal CAs

Certificate chaining, or *chain building*, is the process by which systems or browsers validate who issued a certificate. To trust a certificate, each certificate in the “chain” is validated based on who signed or issued it. The process is considered successful when validation reaches a root certificate that is trusted. For a root certificate to be trusted, it must be present in a system or browser’s trusted root store.




Two Types of Root CA Trust Stores

Browsers and operating systems maintain two types of trusted root stores: the system-trusted root store and the updatable trusted root store. System-trusted root certificates follow strict guidelines to be included with the initial installation and are updated only by the operating system or browser vendor.

Organizations and end users can add private or internal PKI root certificates to the updatable trusted store; however, it is maintained independently from the system store. When a browser validates a certificate through the chaining process and the chain ends with a root certificate in the system-trusted root store, it must comply with the CAB Forum guidelines. Certificates that chain to a private or internal PKI root certificate added by an organization or end user are not subject to CAB Forum rules or guidelines.

ROOT CA CERTIFICATE



ROOT CA DETAILS AND PROGRAMS

In the past, Microsoft acted as a primary authority for vetting root certificates and was relied upon by many software vendors. More recently, companies and products have chosen to create their own root CA programs. This shift is significant because organizations may now need to track multiple lists of trusted root CA certificates.

Browsers

This isn't meant as an exhaustive list; however, it covers the majority of what our clients are using.



Chrome's list of trusted root CA certificates, currently **118** in the version **19** list can be found by entering: `chrome://system/#chrome_root_store` then Expand

About SystemSystem diagnostic data

Details

Expand all...

Collapse all...

CHROME VERSION		137.0.7151.120
OS VERSION		Windows NT: 10.0.26100
Related Website Sets		Disabled
about_sync_data	Expand...	
chrome_root_store	Collapse...	version: 19

hash: 55926084EC963A64B96E2ABE01CE0BA86A64FBFBEC7AAB5AFC155B37FD76066

name: Actalis Authentication Root CA

hash: 18CE6CFE7BF14E60B2E347B8DFE868CB31D02EBB3ADA271569F50343B46DB3A4

name: Amazon Root CA 3

hash: 1BA5B2AA9C65401A82960118F80BEC4F62304D83CEC4713A19C39C011EA46DB4

name: Amazon Root CA 2

hash: 8ECD6884F3D87B1125BA31AC3FCB13D7016DE7F57CC904FE1CB97C6AE98196E

name: Amazon Root CA 1

hash: E35D28419ED02025CFA69038CD623962458DA5C695FBDEA3C22B0BF25897092

name: Amazon Root CA 4

hash: 5C58468D55F58E497E743982D2B50010B6D165374ACF83A7D4A32DB768C4408E

name: Certum Trusted Network CA

hash: B676F2EDDAE8775CD36CB0F63CD1D4603961F49E6265BA013A2F0307B6D0B804

name: Certum Trusted Network CA 2

hash: F356BEA244B7A91EB35D53CA9AD7864ACE018E2D35D5F8F96DDF68A6F41AA474

name: Atos TrustedRoot 2011

hash: 57DE0583EFD2B26E0361DA99DA9DF4648DEF7EE8441C3B728AFA9BCDE0F9B26A

name: Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional CIF A62634068

hash: 9A114025197C5BB95D94E63D55CD43790847B646B23CDF11ADA4A00EFF15FB48

name: Buypass Class 2 Root CA

hash: EDF7EBBCA27A2A384D387B7D4010C666E2EDB4843E4C29B4AE1D5B9332E6B24D

name: Buypass Class 3 Root CA

hash: 657CFE2FA73FAA38462571F332A2363A46FCE7020951710702CDFBB6EEDA3305

name: OU=certSIGN ROOT CA G2,O=CERTSIGN SA,C=RO

hash: EAA962C4FA4A6BAFEBE415196D351CCD888D4F53F3FA8AE6D7C466A94E6042BB

name: OU=certSIGN ROOT CA,O=certSIGN,C=RO

hash: 50C3D78E4E1D5E45547A04E6873E64F90CF9536D1CCC2EF800F355C4C5FD70FD

name: CFCA EV ROOT

hash: C0A6F4DC63A24BDFC54EF2A6A082A0A72DE35803E2FF5FF527AE5D87206DFD5

name: OU=ePKI Root Certification Authority,O=Chunghwa Telecom Co., Ltd.,C=TW

hash: 49E7A42ACF0EA6287050054B52564B650E4F49E42E348D6AA38E039E957B1C1

name: D-TRUST Root Class 3 CA 2 2009

hash: EEC5496B988CE98625B934092EEC2908BED0B0F316C2D4730C84EAF1F3D34881

name: D-TRUST Root Class 3 CA 2 EV 2009

hash: 91E2F5788D5810EBA7BA58737DE1548A8ECACD014598BC0B143E041B17052552

name: T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2

hash: FD73DAD31C644FF1B43BEF0CCDDA96710B9CD9875ECA7E3170A7F3E96D522BBD

name: T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 3

hash: D48D3D23EEDB50A459E55197601C27774B9D7B18C94D5A059511A10250B93168

name: Certigna Root CA

hash: E3B6A2DB2ED7CE48842F7AC53241C7B71D54144BFB40C1F3F1D0B42F5EEA12D

name: Certigna

hash: 31AD6648F8104138C738F39EA4320133393E3A18CC02296F97C2AC9EF6731D0

name: DigiCert Global Root G3

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ROOT CA DETAILS AND PROGRAMS cont.



Similarly, Edge trusted root list currently **249** in version **24** can be viewed here:
`edge://system/#chrome_root_store` then Expand

About SystemSystem diagnostic data

Details

Expand all

Collapse all

EDGE VERSION		137.0.3296.93
OS VERSION		Windows NT: 10.0.26100
Related Website Sets	Expand...	
about_sync_data	Expand...	
chrome_root_store	Collapse...	version: 24

hash: 1501F89C54DCFC36CF588A17C9FD7CFCEB9EE01E8729BE355E25DE80EB6284B4

name: CAEDICOM Root

hash: D48D3D23EEDB50A459E55197601C27774B9D7B18C94D5A059511A10250B93168

name: Certigna Root CA

hash: 8ECDE6884F3D87B1125BA31AC3FCB13D7016DE7F57CC904FE1CB97C6AE98196E

name: Amazon Root CA 1

hash: 1BA5B2AA8C65401A82960118F80BEC4F62304D83CEC4713A19C39C011EA46DB4

name: Amazon Root CA 2

hash: 18CE6CFE7BF14E60B2E347B8DFE868CB31D02EBB3ADA271569F50343B46DB3A4

name: Amazon Root CA 3

hash: E35D28419ED02025CFA69038CD623962458DA5C695FBDEA3C22B0BF25897092

name: Amazon Root CA 4

hash: 44B545AA8A25E65A73CA15DC27FC36D24C1CB9953A066539B11582DC487B4833

name: Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions ECC RootCA 2015

hash: A040929A02CE53B4ACF4F2FFC6981CE4496F755E6D45FE0B2A692BCD52523F36

name: Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions RootCA 2015

hash: D3D607A9FF24A19523B6DA9D2C649446F8788CB96D9FD130972E120C13677730

name: I.CA Root CA/RSA

hash: 229CCC196D32C98421CC119E78486EEBEF603AED525C6B88B47ABB740692B96

name: Cisco RXC-R2

hash: 2CABEAFE37D06CA22ABA7391C0033D25982952C453647349763A3AB5AD6CCF69

name: GlobalSign

hash: 604D32D036895AED3BFEFAEB727C009EC0F2B3CDF42A1C71730E6A72C3BE9D4

name: MULTICERT Root Certification Authority 01

hash: BFFF8FD04433487D6A8AA60C1A29767A9FC2BBB05E420F713A13B992891D3893

name: GDCA TrustAUTH R5 ROOT

hash: C34C5DF53080078FFE45B21A7F600469917204F4F0293F1D7209393E5265C04F

name: CCA India 2015 SPL

hash: 8F9ADB6D895DAB5ADF5C3D3FAB83927BE0FB64EF82485C62280D584E8BD55D22

name: Swedish Government Root Authority v3

hash: C795FF8FF20C966688F064A1E091421D3110A3456C17EC2404B998738741F622

name: Tunisian Root Certificate Authority - TunRootCA2

hash: 70B922BFDAD0E3F4A342E4EE22D579AE598D071CC5EC9C30F123680340388AEA5

name: O=Government Root Certification Authority, C=TW

hash: 2A8DA2F8D23E0CD3B5871ECFB0F42276CA73230667F474EED71C5EE32CC3EC6

name: Thailand National Root Certification Authority - G1

hash: 59769007F7685D0FCD50872F9F95D5755A5B2B457D81F3692B610A98672F0E1B

name: TWCA Global Root CA

hash: 4D2491414CFE956746EC4CEFA6CF6772E28A1329432F9D8A907AC4CB5DADC15A

name: Staat der Nederlanden EV Root CA

hash: 3C4FB0B95AB8B30032F432B86F535FE172C185D0FD39865837CF36187FA6F428

name: Staat der Nederlanden Root CA - G3

hash: 2A99F5BC1174B73CBB1D620884E01C34E51CCB3978DA125F0E33268883BF4158

name: Certinomis - Root CA

hash: C2157309D9AEE17BF34F4DF5E88DBAEBAS7E0361EB814CBC239F4D54D329A38D

name: Főtanúsítványkiadó - Kormányzati Hitelesítés Szolgáltató

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ROOT CA DETAILS AND PROGRAMS cont.



Firefox certificates can be viewed by entering:
`about:preferences#privacy` then select View Certificates

The screenshot shows the Firefox 'about:preferences#privacy' page. The left sidebar contains navigation links: General, Home, Search, Privacy & Security (highlighted in blue), Sync, and More from Mozilla. The main content area is titled 'Website Advertising Preferences' and includes a checkbox for 'Allow websites to perform privacy-preserving ad measurement'. Below this is the 'Security' section, which includes 'Deceptive Content and Dangerous Software Protection' with three checked options: 'Block dangerous and deceptive content', 'Block dangerous downloads', and 'Warn you about unwanted and uncommon software'. The 'Certificates' section has two checked options: 'Query OCSP responder servers to confirm the current validity of certificates' and 'Allow Firefox to automatically trust third-party root certificates you install'. A red arrow points to the 'View Certificates...' button in the bottom right corner.

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ROOT CA DETAILS AND PROGRAMS cont.



Unlike the other browsers, Safari relies on the root certificate store of the system it is running on. This can be viewed in the system Keychain on macOS, or in iOS under General > About > Certificate Trust Settings.

Certificates

☒ Query OCSP responder servers to confirm the current validity of certificates

[View Certificates...](#)

Default Keychains

login

iCloud

Custom Keychains

Microsoft_Entity_Certificates-db


System Keychains

System

System Roots

Keychain Access

All Items | Passwords | Secure Notes | My Certificates | Keys | Certificates



Visa Information Delivery Root CA

Root certificate authority

Expires: Sunday, June 29, 2025 at 12:42:42 PM Central Daylight Time

✔ This certificate is valid

Name	Kind	Expires	Keychain
Visa Information Delivery Root CA	certificate	Jun 29, 2025 at 12:42:42...	System Roots
Entrust Root Certification Authority	certificate	Nov 27, 2026 at 2:53:42...	System Roots
Developer ID Certification Authority	certificate	Feb 1, 2027 at 4:12:15 PM	System Roots
Certum CA	certificate	Jun 11, 2027 at 5:46:39 AM	System Roots
Certigna	certificate	Jun 29, 2027 at 10:13:05...	System Roots
GlobalSign Root CA	certificate	Jan 28, 2028 at 6:00:00...	System Roots
D-TRUST Root CA 3 2013	certificate	Sep 20, 2028 at 3:25:51...	System Roots
NetLock Arany (Class Gold) Főtanúsítvány	certificate	Dec 6, 2028 at 9:08:21 AM	System Roots
AAA Certificate Services	certificate	Dec 31, 2028 at 5:59:59...	System Roots
GlobalSign	certificate	Mar 18, 2029 at 5:00:00...	System Roots

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ROOT CA DETAILS AND PROGRAMS *cont.*

Operating Systems

Similarly to browsers, we are only covering the operating systems most of our clients use.





Microsoft Server & Clients

Windows operating systems and applications may or may not use the same root certificate store. However, when it comes to CAB Forum guidelines, the browser(s) are what matter. For example, a certificate issued by a public CA and used for secure LDAP would not be impacted by CAB Forum guidelines. In that case, the only consideration would be whether the certificate was issued by a trusted authority.



Apple macOS & iOS

Both macOS and iOS operate similarly when using the Safari browser. Safari utilizes the system's trust store, which contains Apple-managed trusted root certificates. When visiting a site with Safari, if the certificate does not chain to an existing root certificate in the Apple-managed trust store, CAB Forum guidelines will not be applied. Browsers other than Safari on macOS or iOS — such as Chrome, Edge, or Firefox — will use their own trusted root stores.



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SUMMARY

Hopefully, we have added clarity about which certificates the **CAB Forum** guidelines apply to, and when the changes can be expected. We also highlighted where the most common browsers and operating systems maintain their lists of trusted public root certificates.

This is an exciting time to be in the PKI space. Multiple changes are on the horizon, including [Post-Quantum Cryptography \(PQC\)](#), additional CAB Forum updates, operating system end-of-life events, and hardware security module upgrades, to name a few.

There's a smarter way forward — and we're here to show you how.

If you're looking to strengthen your PKI or certificate management strategy, let's connect and explore how our products and consulting services can support your goals.



Let's Chat

